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INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations (U.N.) Security Council’s paralysis, caused by the 
Russian and Chinese veto of resolutions addressing the Syrian crisis, calls 
into question the international community’s commitment to act collectively 
“in a timely and decisive manner” through the Security Council to protect 
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the populations from mass atrocity crimes, including crimes against 
humanity.1 
Several reports, including one each in the latter half of 2011 by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,2 the U.N. Human 
Rights Council (HRC),3 and the U.N. Committee Against Torture,4 and one 
each by the HRC (February 22, 2012)5 and Amnesty International (AI) 
(August 2012),6 affirmed allegations that government forces and militias 
have committed gross human rights violations that are widespread and 
systematic, amounting to crimes against humanity with the apparent 
knowledge and consent of those at the highest level of the Syrian 
government.7 
To illustrate, the fact-finding mission established by the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights analyzed first-hand 
information obtained through interviews conducted with victims and 
witnesses of murder and disappearances, torture, and persecution, and found 
patterns of human rights violations that may amount to crimes against 
humanity.8 The first report of the Independent International Commission of 
Inquiry, submitted in November 2011, stated: 
  
    1.  This was the commitment undertaken by the heads of state and government 
gathered at the U.N. World Summit in New York in September 2005. 2005 World Summit 
Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005) [hereinafter World 
Summit Outcome] (the atrocity crimes to which R2P applies include genocide, war crimes, 
and ethnic cleansing, along with crimes against humanity and their incitement). 
 2. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, 
A/HRC/18/53 (Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter A/HRC/18/53].  
 3. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 (Nov. 23, 2011) 
[hereinafter A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1]. 
 4. U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Syria: 
UN Committee Against Torture Concerned About Gross and Widespread Rights Violations 
(Nov. 25, 2011) (reporting that the U.N. Committee Against Torture expressed alarm on 
November 25, 2011, that “prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations ha[d] not been 
undertaken” despite reports of massive human rights violations. It “requested the 
Government of Syria to provide it with a special report by 9 March 2012 . . . .”). 
 5. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/19/69 (Feb. 22, 2012) 
[hereinafter Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 2012]. 
 6. ALL-OUT REPRESSION: PURGING DISSENT IN ALEPPO, SYRIA, AMNESTY INT’L 
(2012), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/all-out-repression-purging-
dissent-in-aleppo-syria [hereinafter ALL-OUT REPRESSION]. 
 7. Appalled at the “indiscriminate and possibly deliberate . . . killing . . . in the area 
of Homs in Syria” in late May 2012, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights said 
that these acts “may amount to crimes against humanity or other forms of international 
crime.” U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Syria: 
Pillay Says El Houleh Killings May Amount to International Crimes (May 27, 2012) 
(quoting Navi Pillay, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights).  
 8. A/HRC/18/53, supra note 2, at 3-4, 20.  
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The substantial body of evidence gathered by the commission indicates 
that these gross violations of human rights have been committed by Syrian 
military and security force since the beginning of the protests in March 
2011. The commission is gravely concerned that crimes against humanity 
have been committed in different locations in the Syrian Arab Republic 
during the period under review.9 
The second Commission report stated that the government had 
“manifestly failed in its responsibility to protect its people. Since November 
2011, its forces have committed more widespread, systematic and gross 
human rights violations.”10 
The AI report of August 2012 detailed a wide range of state-directed, 
systematic violations of human rights, including the deliberate targeting of 
peaceful protesters, hunting-down of injured protesters, torture, targeting of 
medics providing emergency treatment to the wounded, arbitrary arrests, 
and disappearances in Syria’s largest and most populous city, Aleppo.11 The 
report, which was based on AI’s field research in and around Aleppo in late 
May 2012, concluded that the Syrian government was responsible for 
systematic violations in Aleppo amounting to crimes against humanity: 
The cases and patterns of abuses investigated in this report, together with 
the gross and widespread human rights abuses documented by Amnesty 
International over the past 18 months in other parts of the country, 
constitute a body of evidence that Syrian government forces and state-
armed militias have been responsible for crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.12 
Because the commitment to protect the populations from serious human 
rights violations, including crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
constitutes the core of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle adopted 
by the world’s leaders at the September 2005 U.N. World Summit, 13 the 
obvious question arises: what is the future of R2P? This inquiry is 
especially pertinent because after the invocation and application of R2P in 
Libya, which resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 
intervention in 2011 leading to the overthrow of Muammar Gadhafi, 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated on January 18, 2012: 
  
 9. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, supra note 3, at 1. 
 10. A/HRC/19/69, supra note 5. 
 11. ALL-OUT REPRESSION, supra note 6, at 10-12, 18-20, 24-26. 
 12. Id. at 8. See also Written Statement, Amnesty Int’l, No More Impunity for 
Crimes Against Humanity in Syria (Dec. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE24/083/2011/en/5ca30b30-247e-41c6-ba8c-
4ec4a2b9d8fd/mde240832011en.pdf. 
 13. See Ved P. Nanda, From Paralysis in Rwanda to Bold Moves in Libya: 
Emergence of the “Responsibility to Protect” Norm Under International Law—Is the 
International Community Ready for It?, 34 HOUS. J. INT’L. L. 1, 39-45 (2011) [hereinafter 
Paralysis in Rwanda]. 
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Today we mark the first decade in the life of the responsibility to protect. 
There will be many more, for we can now say with confidence that this 
fundamental principle of human protection is here to stay. . . .  
In 2011, history took a turn for the better. The responsibility to protect 
came of age; The principle was tested as never before. The results were 
uneven, but at the end of the day, tens of thousands of lives were saved. 
We gave hope to people long oppressed. In Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, South 
Sudan, Yemen and Syria, by our words and actions, we demonstrated that 
human protection is a defining purpose of the United Nations in the 
twenty-first century.  
We also learned important lessons. For one, we have learned that this 
Organization cannot stand on the sidelines when challenged to take 
preventive action.14 
When the Secretary-General spoke, the U.N. was already facing a test in 
Syria. Since then, more than nine months have passed and Syria continues 
to burn, with the spiral of violence still on the rise. Day after day we hear 
reports of the carnage as innocent men, women, and children are tortured 
and killed. According to media reports, as of the beginning of September 
2012, the death toll in Syria had reportedly already surpassed 18,000.15 
After Libya, the R2P glow quickly faded. Silence at the U.N. has been 
accompanied by lack of an effective response by the international 
community. Hence, this question is valid: “Will R2P rhetoric suffer the 
same fate as the ‘never again’ slogan in the aftermath of the Holocaust?” 
This article is a response to that inquiry. Part II provides an historical 
context leading to the birth of R2P. This is followed in Part III by a review 
of the NATO action in Libya, and in Part IV, the Syrian crisis. Part V 
examines Brazil’s proposal to supplement R2P with RWP (responsibility 
while protecting) and explores the means to implement and operationalize 
R2P. Part VI is the concluding section. 
  
 14. U.N. Secretary General, ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Came of Age in 2011, 
Secretary-General Tells Conference, Stressing Need to Prevent Conflict Before it Breaks 
Out, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/14068 (Jan. 18, 2012). 
 15. Timely and Decisive Response Vital to Uphold ‘Responsibility to Protect’-UN 
Officials, U.N. NEWS CENTRE, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42806&Cr= 
responsibility+to+protect&Cr1=#.UFPmdU8kWaI (“The Secretary-General pointed to the 
immense human cost of failing to protect the population of Syria, where more than 18,000 
people, mostly civilians, have died since the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad 
began 18 months ago.”); See also Syria Crisis: Death Toll Tops 17,000, Says Opposition 
Group, HUFFINGTON POST WORLD (July 7, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/ 
07/09/syria-crisis-death-toll-17000_n_1658708.html.  
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I. THE GENESIS OF THE “RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT” PRINCIPLE AND 
ITS EVOLUTION 
As the Secretary-General marked “the first decade in the life of the 
responsibility to protect,” he was implicitly referring to the December 2001 
report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), entitled The Responsibility to Protect,16 which was 
most influential in giving the concept its final shape. It is worth noting that 
the Commission’s initiative was in response to the call of then—U.N. 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his Millennium Report to the General 
Assembly in April 2000, for member states to “unite in the pursuit of more 
effective policies, to stop organized mass murder and egregious violations 
of human rights.”17 
The tragedies of Rwanda and Srebrenica, which had happened on Kofi 
Annan’s watch, were the precursors to his call. Humanitarian intervention 
as a possible response to such tragedies had come under severe criticism for 
its potential abuse.18 Annan acknowledged the criticism as he stated: “[I]f 
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross 
and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our 
common humanity?”19 
The ICISS’s response to this challenge was to shift the debate from the 
“right of humanitarian intervention” or “right to intervene,” to the 
  
 16. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT (2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 
[hereinafter ICISS Report]. 
 17. The Secretary-General’s Millennium Report, We the Peoples: The Role of the 
United Nations in the 21st Century, 47, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (April 3, 2000), 
www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/ch3.pdf. See also Press Release, Secretary General, ‘We 
the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century,’ to General Assembly, U.N. 
Press Release GA/9704 (Apr. 3, 2000). See generally Paralysis in Rwanda, supra note 13 
(discussing the development of the R2P concept and its invocations in Libya). 
 18. For discussion of humanitarian intervention, see generally 21 SEAN D. MURPHY, 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER (Burns 
H. Weston et al. eds., 1996); FERNANDO R. TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN 
INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (2d ed. 1997); Matthew C. Cooper, A Note to States 
Defending Humanitarian Intervention: Examining Viable Arguments Before the 
International Court of Justice, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 167 (2011); James A.R. 
Nafziger, Humanitarian Intervention in a Community of Power Part II, 22 DENV. J. INT’L L. 
& POL’Y 219 (1994); Ved P. Nanda et. al., Tragedies in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda 
and Liberia-Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention under International Law-
Part II, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 827 (1998); Jide Nzelibe, Courting Genocide: The 
Unintended Effects of Humanitarian Intervention, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1171 (2009); W. 
Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive 
Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 3 (2000); 
Thomas G. Weiss, The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? Responsibility to Protect in a 
Unipolar Era, 35 SECURITY DIALOGUE 135 (2004). 
 19. ICISS Report, supra note 16, at 2. 
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“responsibility to protect,” which meant a focus on the point of view of 
those seeking or needing support instead of those who may be considering 
intervention.20 It must, however, be acknowledged that in the mid-1990s 
Francis Deng, then Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons 
and later the Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide, and his 
colleagues at the Brookings Institution had already defined sovereignty not 
simply as a right but as a responsibility.21 And as several international legal 
instruments have mandated, sovereignty is not without obligations.22 
The ICISS’s “responsibility to protect” concept comprises three distinct 
responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent,23 the responsibility to react 
(which in extreme cases may include military intervention),24 and the 
responsibility to rebuild after military intervention.25 The responsibility to 
prevent focuses on the importance of early warning mechanisms and 
conflict prevention, and on the use of diplomatic, economic, and military 
means to contain a conflict before it escalates. The responsibility to react 
applies when a state is either unable or unwilling to protect its citizens from 
massive human rights violations occurring in the state. The Commission 
proposed a “just cause” threshold for such intervention to be “serious and 
irreparable harm” to human beings, such as large scale “loss of life,” or 
large scale ethnic cleansing.26 It also proposed four precautionary principles 
to guide the use of force once this threshold has been reached: 1) right 
intention to “halt or avert human suffering”;27 2) last resort after all 
diplomatic means have been explored; 3) proportional means;28 and 4) 
reasonable prospect of success in ending the suffering so that “the 
  
 20. Id. ¶ 2.29. 
 21. FRANCIS M. DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA (1996); See also Francis M. Deng, Frontiers of Sovereignty: A 
Framework of Protection, Assistance, and Development for the Internally Displaced, 8 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 249 (1995). 
 22. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, art. 1, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (obligating states to “prevent 
and punish” the crime of genocide). See also Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/8082 (Oct. 24, 
1970) (listing, along with the principle of sovereign equality of States, the duty of States to 
fulfill in good faith their international obligations); International Law Commission, 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res 56/83, 53rd Sess., Jan. 
28, 2002, arts. 40, 41, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001) (calling for a positive duty of 
a State to cooperate to bring to an end any serious breaches of a peremptory norm of general 
international law).  
 23. ICISS Report, supra note 16, ¶¶ 3.1.43. 
 24. Id. ¶¶ 4.1-.43. 
 25. Id. ¶¶ 5.1-.31. 
 26. Id. ¶¶ 4.18-.19, 4.32-.33. 
 27. Id. ¶ 4.33. 
 28. Id. ¶ 4.39 
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consequences of action [are] not likely to be worse than the consequences of 
inaction.”29 
The ICISS report identified the U.N. Security Council as the right 
authority under the U.N. Charter to authorize military intervention.30 
Addressing the veto issue, the Commission said that the five permanent 
members of the Security Council should agree not to use the veto where 
their vital state interests are not at stake, assuming there is majority support 
for such action.31 
The report offered alternative options if the Security Council is unable to 
act: an emergency special session of the General Assembly under the 
“Uniting for Peace” resolution,32 or action of regional organizations “subject 
to their seeking subsequent authorization from the Security Council.”33 The 
report cautions the Security Council that if the Council fails to live up to its 
responsibility, single states or coalitions might take action.34 
The next stage in the evolutionary process was the December 2004 
Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 
established by Secretary-General Kofi Annan.35 The Panel endorsed a 
“collective international responsibility to protect,” which it said was an 
“emerging norm,” while supporting the ICISS report’s recommendation that 
the Security Council is the proper U.N. body to authorize military 
intervention as a last resort “in the event of genocide and other large-scale 
killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian 
law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to 
prevent.”36 The Panel, however, did not discuss any alternative to the 
Security Council taking action, although it did urge the permanent members 
to refrain from “use of the veto in cases of genocide and large-scale human 
rights abuses.”37 
The Panel also endorsed the ICISS report’s “just cause” threshold as well 
as its precautionary principles, while renaming the basic criteria of 
legitimacy—seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proper means, 
  
 29. ICISS Report, supra note 16. at XII, ¶ 4.41. 
 30. Id. ¶¶, 6.13-6.15. 
 31. Id. ¶¶ 8.28-8.30. 
 32. Id. ¶¶ 6.29-6.30; Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Nov. 
3, 1950).  
 33. ICISS Report, supra note 16, ¶¶ 6.31-6.35. 
 34. Id. ¶ 6.39. 
 35. See generally High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, U.N. 
Secretary-General, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: A 
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).  
 36. Id. ¶ 203. 
 37. Id. ¶ 256. 
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and balance of consequences.38 Kofi Annan accepted the Panel’s 
recommendation in his March 2005 report.39 
Finally, in September 2005, the U.N. World Summit of Heads of State 
and Government considered the Secretary-General’s report and, while 
endorsing each state’s “responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,” added 
that: “[t]his responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes.”40 The 
Summit further resolved: 
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means . . . to help to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we 
are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council, . . . on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should 
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly 
failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.41 
A comparison of the commitments undertaken by the 2005 World 
Summit with the recommendations in the ICISS report shows several 
differences between the two documents. The World Summit commitments 
are restrictive. First, the scope of the responsibility to protect is limited in 
the Outcome Document to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity, while the ICISS report encompassed “large scale 
loss of life” or “large scale ethnic cleansing.” Second, the scope of possible 
collective action is limited in light of the Outcome Document’s rather vague 
wording regarding the states’ obligation when genocide and other atrocity 
crimes are committed—they are “prepared to act” in a timely manner “on a 
case-by-case basis.” Third, there is no reference in the Outcome Document 
to the role of the General Assembly or the possibility of action without the 
Security Council’s authorization. And fourth, the Outcome Document drops 
the ICISS’s suggested guidelines on the use of force—the “just cause” 
threshold and the precautionary principles. 
  
 38. Id. ¶ 207. 
 39. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards 
Development, Security and Human Rights for All, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005, (Mar. 21, 2005).  
 40. World Summit Outcome, supra note 1, ¶¶ 138-39. 
 41. Id. ¶ 139. For the commitments compared here between the World Summit 
Outcome Document principles and the ICISS report, see id. ¶¶ 139 and supra note 16, 
¶¶4.18-.19, 4.32-.33, respectively. See also U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) 
(articulating R2P’s three-pillar framework) [hereinafter Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect].  
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II. THE APPLICATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN LIBYA 
The uprisings that toppled Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Zine el-Abidine 
ben Ali in Tunisia did not spare Libya. In response to protests and 
demonstrations, which began in February 2011, the Muammar Qaddafi 
regime used force to suppress dissent.42 The U.N. Secretary-General was 
outraged at reports that government troops had fired at demonstrators from 
aircraft, and called for an immediate end to the violence on February 21, 
2011.43 The following day, the Security Council issued a statement on the 
Libyan situation in which the members “expressed grave concern, 
condemned the violence” and repression against the civilians and 
demonstrators, and called upon the Libyan Government to “meet its 
responsibility to protect its population.”44 Four days later, in response to the 
reports about the regime’s use of foreign mercenaries, detention and torture 
of the opposition, shooting of peaceful demonstrators, and indiscriminate 
killing, the Secretary-General called upon the Security Council to take 
concrete action.45 
Expressing grave concern at the Libyan situation, the U.N. Security 
Council condemned the violence and use of force against civilians in 
Resolution 1970, which it adopted on February 26, 2011.46 Prior to the 
adoption of this resolution, several U.N. officials had also condemned the 
serious violations of human rights in Libya. These included the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, who denounced “the use of 
live ammunition . . . against peaceful protesters in Libya”47 and called for an 
  
 42. See generally Int’l Coal. for the Responsibility to Protect, The Crisis in Libya, 
RESPONSIBILITYTOPROTECT.ORG, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-libya (last visited Sept. 
2012).  
 43. Press Release, Secretary-General, Outraged Secretary-General Calls for 
Immediate End to Violence in Libya, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/13408 AFR/2119 (Feb. 22, 
2011). 
 44. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Libya, 
U.N. Press Release SC/10180 AFR/2120 (Feb. 22, 2011). 
 45. Press Release, Security Council, Fundamental Issues of Peace, Security at Stake, 
Secretary-General Warns as He Briefs Security Council on Situation in Libya, U.N. Press 
Release SC/10185 (Feb. 25, 2011); Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General 
Tells Security Council Time to Consider Concrete Action in Libya, as Loss of Time Means 
More Loss of Lives, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/13418-SC/10186-AFR/2124 (Feb. 25, 
2011). 
 46. See S.C. Res. 1970 (2011), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011) [hereinafter 
U.N. Doc. S.C. Res. 1970]. 
 47. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Pillay Denounces Violence 
by Security Forces in Libya, Bahrain and Other Countries in Middle East and North Africa 
(Feb. 18, 2011), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10738&LangID=
E. 
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international inquiry into the violence,48 and a group of U.N. Human Rights 
experts “who warned . . . that the gross violations of human rights 
committed by the government of Libya could amount to ‘crimes against 
humanity.’”49 
The U.N. Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on February 25, 
2011, strongly condemning “the gross and systematic human rights 
violations committed in Libya, including indiscriminate armed attacks 
against civilians, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, detention and 
torture of peaceful demonstrators, some of which may also amount to 
crimes against humanity.”50 Under the resolution the Council established an 
independent international commission of inquiry to investigate the alleged 
human rights violations, and requested the Commission “to establish the 
facts and circumstances of such violations and of the crimes perpetrated 
and, where possible to identify those responsible . . . [so that] those 
individuals responsible are held accountable.”51 The Council also 
recommended to the General Assembly to suspend Libya’s membership in 
the Human Rights Council,52 which the General Assembly did on March 1, 
2011.53 
The Arab League, the African Union, and the Secretary General of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference also condemned the violations of 
human rights and international human rights law being committed in Libya, 
which the Security Council welcomed in the preamble of Resolution 1970.54 
  
 48. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Pillay Calls for International 
Inquiry into Libyan Violence and Justice for Victims (Feb. 22, 2011), 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10743&LangID=E 
 49. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Libya: “Stop the 
Massacre”—UN Experts (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/ 
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10747&LangID=E 
 50. Human Rights Council Resolution 15/1, Situation of Human Rights in the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, 15th Spec. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-15/1 (Feb. 25, 2011) 
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-15/1]. 
 51. Id. ¶ 11. See also U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Council 
Holds Interactive Dialogue with Commission of Inquiry on Alleged Human Rights 
Violations in Libya (June 9, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/ 
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11131&LANGID=E (finding by the Commission on behalf of 
the Commission’s chair, Professor Cherif Bassiouni, that the government forces and their 
supporters had committed serious violations of international law, including murder, torture, 
persecution, and enforced disappearance, and presented it to the Human Rights Council 
meeting, and that these violations constituted “crimes against humanity” under customary 
international law, and as defined in the International Criminal Court’s statute, as well as 
committing serious violations of international humanitarian law, amounting to war crimes); 
See also Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to 
Investigate all Alleged Violations of International Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/17/44, 17th Sess. (June 1, 2011).  
 52. U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-15/1, supra note 50, ¶ 14. 
 53. Suspension of the Rights of Membership of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the 
Human Rights Council, G.A. Res. 65/265, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/265 (Mar. 3, 2011). 
 54. U.N. Doc S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 46, at pmbl.  
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It welcomed the Human Rights Council’s decision regarding the 
establishment of an independent international commission of inquiry,55 and 
specifically invoked “the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its 
population.”56 
The Security Council deplored “the gross and systematic violation of 
human rights,” expressed “deep concern at the death of civilians,” rejected 
“unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian 
population made from the highest level of the Libyan government,”57 
demanded an immediate end to the violence, and urged the Libyan 
authorities to act “with the utmost restraint, respect human rights and 
international humanitarian law.”58 It also decided to refer the Libyan 
situation to the International Criminal Court59 and imposed sanctions 
against Libya, including an arms embargo,60 travel ban against named 
government officials,61 and an asset freeze.62 The Security Council 
established a new sanctions committee63 and decided to remain actively 
seized of the matter.64 
The Libyan government remained defiant, violence was on the rise, and 
there were calls for a no-fly zone and international action to protect 
civilians. To illustrate, in his statement to the General Assembly on March 
1, the U.N. Secretary-General commented on the “reports that Government 
forces have fired indiscriminately on peaceful protesters,” and reminded the 
General Assembly that “[o]ur collective challenge will be to provide real 
protection for the people of Libya.”65  
On the same day, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights called on “the responsibility of the African Union, the Peace and 
Security Council of the African Union, and the International Community to 
take all the necessary political and legal measures for the protection of the 
  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. ¶ 2(a).  
 59. Id. ¶¶ 4-8. See also Press Release, International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I Issues Three Warrants of Arrest for Muammar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, 
and Abdullah al-Senussi (June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/D07229DE-
4E3D-45BC-8CB1-F5DAF8370218.htm. (reporting that the International Criminal Court 
issued warrants of arrest for Gaddafi, one of his sons, and Libya’s Intelligence Chief on 
murder and persecution charges through the state apparatus and Security Forces which 
constituted crimes against humanity).  
 60. U.N. Doc. S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 46, ¶¶ 9-14. 
 61. Id. ¶15, Annex I.  
 62. Id. ¶¶ 17-22, Annex II.  
 63. Id. ¶ 24.  
 64. Id. ¶ 28. 
 65. Press Release, Secretary-General, United Nations Response To Violence Against 
Civilians in Libya Sends Strong Message; There is ‘No Impunity’ For Crimes Against 
Humanity, Secretary-General Says, U.N. Press Release, para. 11, SG/SM/13425, GA/11051, 
AFR/2130 (Mar. 1, 2011). Id. at para. 26.  
12 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 21:1  
Libyan population.”66 The Secretary General of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC), Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, announced (on 
March 8) that the OIC “aligned with those calling for a no-fly zone over 
Libya with a view to protecting civilians from air strikes [, and] called on 
the Security Council to assume its responsibility in this regard.”67 On March 
10 the European Parliament adopted a resolution stressing “that the EU and 
its Member States must honour their Responsibility to Protect, in order to 
save Libyan civilians from large-scale armed attacks,” and calling on  
“the High Representative and the Member States to stand ready for a UNSC 
decision on further measures, including the possibility of a no-fly  
zone aimed at preventing the regime from targeting the civilian population 
 . . . .”
68
 
On March 12, “[t]he Arab League called on the UN Security Council [ ] 
to immediately impose a no-fly zone over Libya and announced its 
recognition of the rebel movement as that country’s legitimate 
government.”69 Two days later, the Permanent Observer of the League of 
Arab States to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the 
U.N. Security Council informing him about the Council of the League’s 
decision “[t]o call upon the Security Council, in view of the deterioration in 
the situation in Libya, to shoulder its responsibility and take the measures 
necessary to immediately impose a no-fly zone on Libyan military aircraft . 
. . .”
70
 The six Arab Gulf Countries also supported the imposition of a no-fly 
zone over Libya to protect civilians from attacks by the Libyan regime.71 
On March 17, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973,72 which 
authorized member states “to take all necessary measures . . . to protect 
  
 66. African Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Resolution on the Human 
Rights Situation in the Great Socialist Peoples’ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Res. 181 (Mar. 1, 
2011), http://www.achpr.org/sessions/9th-eo/resolutions/181/. 
 67. Ihsanoglu Support No-Fly Decision at Oic Meeting on Libya, Calls for an 
Islamic Humanitarian Programme in and Outside Libya, ORG. OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION 
(Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.oic/oci.org/topic_print.asp?t_id=5031.  
 68. Resolution of 10 March 2011 on the Southern Neighbourhood, and Libya in 
particular, EUR. PARL. DOC. PV P7_TA(2011)0095 (Mar. 10, 2011), ¶10, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-
0095+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.  
 69. Richard Leiby & Muhammad Mansour, Arab League Asks U.N. for No-Fly Zone 
Over Libya, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/arab-
league-asks-un-for-no-fly-zone-over-libya/2011/03/12/ABoie0R_print.html.  
 70. U.N. Security Council, Letter dated Mar. 14, 2011 from the Permanent Observer 
of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/2011/137 (Mar. 15, 2011). 
 71. GCC Supports No-Fly Zone Over Libya, Call for Urgent Arab Summit, GOING 
GLOBAL EAST MEETS WEST—ARCHIVES (Mar. 8, 2011), http://articlesofinterest-
kelley.blogspot.com/2011/03/gcc-supports-no-fly-zone-over-libya.html. 
 72. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973, (Mar. 17, 2011) 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm#Resolution [hereinafter U.N. 
Doc. S.C. Res. 1973]. 
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civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in [Libya], 
including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form 
on any part of Libyan territory.”73 At that time, Paul Williams and Colleen 
Popkin observed that “the world witnessed a brief moment of legal and 
moral clarity.”74  
The Security Council did indeed take a bold step by reiterating the 
Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect the Libyan population, 
reaffirming the primary responsibility of the parties to armed conflicts “to 
take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians,”75 and, as noted 
earlier, “[a]uthoriz[ing] Member States . . . to take all necessary measures . . 
. to protect civilians . . . .”76 The Libyan situation called for such measures, 
for Gaddafi had earlier called the protesters “cockroaches” and promised to 
track them down and kill them, “house by house”—reminiscent of the 
language used by those perpetrating the Rwandan massacre—and had 
pledged “no mercy” to those who did not surrender as his forces were on the 
outskirts of Benghazi on March 17.77 The Security Council established a no-
fly zone78 and further strengthened the sanctions imposed by Resolution 
1970.79 
Pursuant to the Security Council’s authorization, a coalition of western 
states intervened militarily in Libya with the U.S. undertaking an air 
campaign against Gaddafi’s forces and NATO assuming responsibility for 
enforcing the arms embargo and no-fly zone. Commencing in March and 
continuing until October 2011, NATO carried out military attacks in Libya. 
President Barack Obama offered the rationale for NATO’s intervention on 
March 28:  
Qaddafi declared he would show “no mercy” to his own people. He 
compared them to rats, and threatened to go door to door to inflict 
punishment. We knew that if we . . . waited one more day, Benghazi, a city 
  
 73. Id. ¶ 4.  
 74. Paul R. Williams & Colleen (Betsy) Popken, North Africa and the Mideast: To 
Where?: Security Council Resolution 1973 on Libya: A Moment of Legal and Moral Clarity, 
44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 225, 225 (2011) [hereinafter Williams & Popken]. 
 75. U.N. Doc. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 72, pmbl.  
 76. Id. ¶ 4.  
 77. See, e.g., Kareem Fahim & David D. Kirkpatrick, Qaddafi’s Grip on the Capital 
Tightens as Revolt Grows, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/ 
23/world/africa/23libya.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all (quoting Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi); 
Responsibility to Protect: The Lessons of Libya, ECONOMIST, May 19, 2011, at 67, available 
at http://www.economist.com/node/18709571; Jon Lee Anderson, Letter from Libya: Sons of 
the Revolution: Can a Ragtag Civilian Army Defeat a Dictator? NEW YORKER (May 9, 
2011), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/09/110509fa_fact_anderson. 
 78. U.N. Doc. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 72, ¶¶ 6-12.  
 79. Id. ¶¶ 13-21, Annex I, Annex II. (strengthening the arms embargo, ban on flying, 
and asset freeze). 
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nearly the size of Charlotte, could suffer a massacre that would have 
reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world.80 
After seven months of military operations by NATO, the Gaddafi regime 
fell and his 42-year rule came to an end; eventually he was captured and 
died at the hands of rebels on October 20, 2011.81 A week later the U.N. 
ended its Libya military mandate,82 and NATO announced it was ending its 
military operations on October 31.83 
As the Syrian government continued killing civilians and the Security 
Council took no action, Williams and Popkin, who applauded a “moment of 
legal and moral clarity” when the Security Council passed Resolution 1973 
concerning Libya, later acknowledged that “[t]his moment of legal and 
moral clarity may have already passed.”84 As I study the Syrian crisis, I will 
discuss this quandary. 
III. THE CRISIS IN SYRIA 
A. Human Rights Violations in Syria Amounted to Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes 
On the heels of the R2P triumph in Libya, protests and nonviolent 
demonstrations in Syria, which began in mid-March 2011, were met with 
extreme violence and brutal repression by government forces to crush the 
opposition.85 This repression led to defections from the army, acquisition of 
  
 80. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on 
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 81. Kareem Fahim, Anthony Shadid, & Rick Gladstone, Violent End to an Era as 
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 85. For concise reports on Syria’s continued state violence against civilians, see 
generally Global Ctr. for the Responsibility to Protect, Current Crisis: Mass Atrocity Crimes 
are Occurring and Urgent Action is Needed: Syria GLOBALR2P.ORG (Jan. 10, 2012), 
http://www.globalr2p.org/media/pdf/R2P_MonitorMarch2012.pdf [hereinafter R2P 
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(May 15, 2012), http://www.globalr2p.org/media/pdf/R2P_MonitorMay2012_Final.pdf 
[hereinafter R2P MONITOR, May 2012]; Global Ctr. for the Responsibility to Protect, Current 
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weapons from other countries by the opposition, and the start of an armed 
uprising aimed at toppling the regime of Bashar al-Assad. This eventually 
turned into a civil war. The protracted conflict between a regime under siege 
and a fractured opposition—with Iran and Russia supporting Assad and 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, among others, supplying arms to the rebels—
galvanized the sectarian divide between Alawites and Sunnis, with both 
sides receiving support from abroad; created unease among the Syrian 
Christian community; and stirred regional unrest and fear of instability.  
Although the international community was outraged at reports of 
civilians being massacred in several places, the use of children as human 
shields by the army and militia, and the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria, 
the U.N.’s inaction was palpable. Russia and China repeatedly blocked 
efforts to get U.N. authority for tougher sanctions and stronger measures 
against the Syrian regime to stop the ongoing slaughter and humanitarian 
catastrophe.  
The Assad regime’s atrocities continued unabated. To illustrate, on July 
27, 2012, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed deep 
alarm at the increased threat to civilians in Syria and noted a discernible 
pattern of actions by government forces as they tried to clear areas they 
claimed were occupied by opposition forces: 
Typically, during the initial stages, after a village or urban district has been 
surrounded, water, electricity and food supplies are cut. This is followed 
by intense shelling and bombardment by a variety of weaponry, 
increasingly with air support from attack helicopters and now reportedly 
even jet aircraft. Then tanks move in, followed by ground forces who 
proceed door-to-door and reportedly often summarily execute people they 
suspect of being opposition fighters, although sometimes they detain them 
. . . . The bodies of those executed or otherwise killed are then sometimes 
burned or taken away.86 
She added: “While such conclusions can only ultimately be reached in a 
court of law, it is my belief, on the basis of evidence gathered from various 
credible sources, that crimes against humanity and war crimes have been, 
and continue to be, committed in Syria.”87 She “was also concerned by 
reports of killings of unarmed prisoners and use of excessive force by 
authorities reacting to unrest in two prisons.”88 
  
GLOBALR2P.ORG (July 15, 2012), http://globalr2p.org/media/pdf/R2P_Monitor_July2012.pdf 
[hereinafter R2P MONITOR, July 2012]. 
 86. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Pillay Warns of 
Consequences Under International Law as Syria Conflict Escalates (July 27, 2012), 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12393&LangID=E 
(quoting Navi Pillay, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights).  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.  
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In July 2012, Human Rights Watch reported a pattern of torture in 
detention centers run by Syrian intelligence agencies, indicating the 
regime’s policy of torture and ill-treatment.89 Based on 200 interviews with 
former detainees from twenty-seven detention centers, the report states: 
“Since the beginning of anti-government protests in March 2011, Syrian 
authorities have subjected tens of thousands of people to arbitrary arrests, 
unlawful detentions, and forced disappearances, ill-treatment, and torture, 
using an extensive network of detention facilities, an archipelago of torture 
centers, scattered throughout Syria.”90  
In response to the events in Syria, the UN Human Rights Council called 
upon the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to appoint a 
fact-finding mission to investigate all alleged violations of international 
human rights law in Syria since March 2011.91 On August 22, 2011, the 
Council considered the report of the fact-finding mission at its 17th Special 
Session and, having expressed “profound concern about its finding, 
including that there were patterns of human rights violations that may 
amount to crimes against humanity,” it “decide[d] to dispatch urgently an 
independent international commission of inquiry . . . to investigate all 
alleged violations of international human rights law [in Syria] since March 
2011.”92 
The Commission submitted its first report on November 23, 2011,93 its 
second report on February 22, 2012,94 and an oral update on June 26, 
2012.95 In another report on August 16, 2012, the Commission asserted that 
  
 89. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TORTURE ARCHIPELAGO: ARBITRARY ARRESTS, TORTURE 
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(2012). 
 90. Id. at 1.  
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Events, 16th Spec. Sess., Apr. 29, 2011, U.N. GAOR, A/HRC/RES/S-16/1, at 1, ¶ 7 (Apr. 
29, 2011). 
 92. Human Rights Council Res. S-17/2, Rep. of the Human Rights Counsel on its 
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A/HRC/19/69]; See also Press Release, U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Syria, Press 
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the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/CRP.1 (June 26, 2012) [hereinafter U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/20/CRP.1].  
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both the Syrian government and the opposition had used “brutal tactics.” 96 
However, it charged that government forces had been responsible for war 
crimes including murder, extrajudicial killings and torture, and gross 
violations of international human rights including unlawful killing, attacks 
against civilians, and acts of sexual violence. These crimes were committed 
in line with State policy, with indications of the involvement at the highest 
levels of the Government, as well as security and armed forces.97 
The Commission faced a major challenge in its inability to visit Syria, 
despite repeated requests.98 This lack of physical access to the country 
significantly hampered its investigation and its ability to fulfill its mandate. 
Although its chairperson did visit Damascus, the Commission had to collect 
firsthand accounts from people who had left the country. It also met with 
regional organizations, NGOs, and many individuals. The Commission’s 
methodology consisted of interviews in the field and electronically, via 
Skype or telephone, with witnesses and victims located inside the country; it 
conducted a total of 1,062 interviews from the time of its establishment in 
September 2011 through August 2012.  
As its standard of proof, the Commission sought to obtain a reliable body 
of evidence that was consistent with other information, and thus the 
incidents reported were based on two or more consistent and reliable 
witness accounts, often further supported by additional corroborating 
evidence.99 According to the Commission, a total of 7,928 people had been 
killed as of July 9, 2012; NGO reports ranged from 17,000 to 22,000, but 
the Commission was unable to confirm these figures.100 
Based upon the substantial body of evidence the Commission gathered, it 
concluded in the first (November 2011) report that the Syrian military and 
security forces had committed gross violations of human rights. It expressed 
grave concern that 
[c]rimes against humanity of murder, torture, rape or other forms of sexual 
violence of comparable gravity, imprisonment or other severe deprivation 
of liberty, enforced disappearances of persons and other inhumane acts of 
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a similar character have occurred in different locations in the country since 
March 2011 . . . .101 
Using a similar methodology as in the first report, the Commission 
concluded in its second report in February 2012:  
The Government has manifestly failed in its responsibility to protect the 
population; its forces have committed widespread, systematic and gross 
human rights violations, amounting to crimes against humanity, with the 
apparent knowledge and consent of the highest levels of the State. Anti-
Government armed groups have also committed abuses, although not 
comparable in scale and organization with those carried out by the State.102 
The Commission added that the crimes against humanity and other gross 
human rights violations it had documented had been committed within a 
system of impunity.103 
On June 14, Francis Deng and Edward Luck, then Special Advisers to 
the U.N. Secretary-General on the prevention of genocide and the 
responsibility to protect, respectively, issued a statement highlighting “the 
Syrian government’s manifest failure to protect its population.”104 They 
urged “the U.N. Security Council to consider the request of the High 
Commissioner on Human Rights to refer the Syrian situation to the 
International Criminal Court.”105 
In its oral update of June 26, the Commission reported on its special 
inquiry into the alleged killings at Al-Houla. As it was unable to visit the 
site of the killing, its report was based on interviews with witnesses either in 
person or, if they had fled the country, via telephone/Skype. The 
Commission found the perpetrators to be “Shabbiha or other local [pro-
Government] militia from neighbouring villages,” and concluded that it had 
[r]easonable grounds to believe that Government forces and Shabbiha 
have perpetrated unlawful killings, arbitrary arrests and detention and 
torture and other forms of ill-treatment . . . . Particularly affected are 
children . . . . interviews conducted by the Commission indicated that 
Government forces and Shabbiha have committed acts of sexual violence 
against men, women and children during the reporting period.106 
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In its report dated, August 15, 2012, the Commission found that armed 
violence had increased in intensity and spread to new areas and, based upon 
“the intensity and duration of the conflict, combined with the increased 
organization capabilities of anti-government armed groups, “the Syrian 
conflict had met the legal threshold for a non-international armed 
conflict.107 Thus, in its assessment of the actions of the parties to the 
hostilities, the Commission applied both international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law.108 
The Commission found “reasonable grounds to believe that Government 
forces and the Shabbiha committed crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and violations of international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law.”109 It also found reasonable grounds to believe that anti-
Government armed groups had also violated human rights law and 
committed war crimes. The Commission underscored that it  
[b]elieves that the large-scale operations during which the most serious 
violations were committed were conducted with the knowledge, or at the 
behest, of the highest levels of Government. Responsibility therefore rests 
with those who either ordered or planned the acts or, in the case of those in 
effective command and control, those who failed to prevent or punish the 
perpetrators. The consistent identification of the Shabbiha perpetrators of 
many of the crimes does not relieve the Government of its responsibility, 
as international law recognizes the responsibility of States that commit 
violations through proxies.110 
Among NGOs, the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect 
(Global R2P) reported on January 10, 2012, that “State violence against 
civilians in Syria constitutes ongoing crimes against humanity by the Syrian 
Arab Republic.”111 It stated that since the beginning of the March 12 mass 
protest movement in Syria,  
Syrian security forces have used tanks, warships and heavy weapons 
against centers of protest. The security forces have also indiscriminately 
fired live ammunition to disperse and terrorize civilian protesters. Since 
March massacres have been perpetrated against civilians in Damascus [and 
six more cities, including Homs]. 
. . . . 
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Crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Syrian government continue to 
pose a grave threat to civilians.112 
Subsequently, in its July 2012 report, Global R2P asserted that “security 
forces and allied ‘shabiha’ militias have been intensifying their attacks 
[massacring civilians, using] helicopter gunships and tanks.”113 
B. The Response at the United Nations 
At the United Nations the grave concern with the Syrian situation was 
accompanied by exploring all possible means to bring the conflict to an end 
and to ensure the protection of the population. Hence, in addition to the 
active engagement of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the 
Human Rights Council, there were ongoing deliberations by members of 
both the Security Council and the General Assembly. As mentioned earlier, 
Russia and China stubbornly resisted any attempt by the Security Council to 
take strong measures against the Syrian government.  
To briefly recapitulate, on August 3, 2011, a Security Council 
Presidential Statement condemned “the widespread violations of human 
rights and the use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities.”114 
The Council adopted this Statement by consensus, with only Lebanon 
“disassociat[ing] itself from the statement.”115 On October 4, 2011, after 
months of negotiations, a European-sponsored Security Council draft 
resolution116 containing sanctions against Syria including travel bans and an 
arms embargo, was defeated after receiving nine affirmative votes but with 
China and Russia vetoing, while South Africa, India, Brazil, and Lebanon 
abstained.117 The U.S. Representative to the U.N., Susan Rice, walked out 
after the vote, saying that “opposition to the resolution was a ‘cheap ruse by 
those who would rather sell arms to the Syrian regime than stand with the 
Syrian people.’”118 
Then, as discussed earlier, on August 22, the U.N. Human Rights 
Council resolved to dispatch its Independent International Commission of 
Inquiry to Syria to investigate all alleged human rights violations since 
  
 112. Id. 
 113. R2P MONITOR, July 2012, supra note 85, at 2. 
 114. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council, Security Council, in 
Statement, Condemns Syrian Authorities for ‘Widespread Violations of Human Rights, Use 
of Force against Civilians,’ U.N. Press Release SC/10352 (Aug. 3, 2011). 
 115. U.N. SCOR, 6598th mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6598 (Aug. 3, 2011). 
 116. S.C. Res., U.N. Doc. S/2011/612 (Oct. 4, 2011). 
 117. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft 
Resolution Condemning Syria’s Crackdown on Anti-Government Protestors, Owing to Veto 
by Russian Federation, China, U.N. Press Release SC/10403 (Oct. 4, 2011) [hereinafter U.N. 
Press Release SC/10403]. 
 118. China and Russia Veto UN Resolution Condemning Syria, BBC NEWS (Oct. 5, 
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15177114. 
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March 2011, in the Syrian Arab Republic, “to establish the facts and 
circumstances that may amount to such violations and of the crimes 
perpetrated and, where possible, to identify those responsible with a view of 
ensuring that perpetrators of violations, including those that may constitute 
crimes against humanity, are held accountable . . . .” 119 On November 2, 
there was a bit of hope when the Syrian government agreed to an Arab 
League peace plan to end the fighting,120 but the hope was short-lived.121 
On December 19, the General Assembly agreed to a resolution urging 
Syria to implement the Arab League plan of action “in its entirety,” 
including cooperating with the HRC’s commission of inquiry.122 Resolution 
66/176 “[s]trongly condemn[ed] the continued grave and systematic human 
rights violations by the Syrian authorities, such as arbitrary executions, 
excessive use of force and the persecution and killing of protesters and 
human rights defenders, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, 
torture and ill-treatment of detainees, including children . . . .”123 
The next attempt to take action in the Security Council came on February 
4, 2012, following the bloody siege of the city of Homs in which some 217 
to 260 people were killed. The strongly worded draft resolution called for 
President Assad to step down and for stringent sanctions against the Assad 
regime. The resolution condemned the ongoing violence and called upon the 
Syrian government to uphold its commitments under an Arab League plan 
that it had signed in November. On this occasion, none of the members 
abstained, but China and Russia again cast vetoes.124 
Subsequently, on February 16, the General Assembly overwhelmingly 
adopted another resolution, again  
[s]trongly condemn[ing] the continued widespread and systematic 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Syrian 
authorities, such as the use of force against civilians, arbitrary executions, 
the killing and persecution of protestors, human rights defenders and 
journalists, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, interference with 
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Human Rights Office (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp? 
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U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/176]; See U.N. Secretary-General, General Assembly Urges Syria to 
Implement Arab League Plan to End Violence (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.un. 
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access to medical treatment, torture, sexual violence, and ill-treatment, 
including against children.125 
A week later, on February 23, the Secretary General and the League of 
Arab States announced their appointment of Kofi Annan as a Joint Special 
Envoy on Syria.126 This move was enthusiastically endorsed by the Security 
Council,127which  
 
expressed its full support for [his] efforts . . . to bring an immediate end to 
all violence and human rights violations, secure humanitarian access, and 
facilitate a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political 
system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations or 
ethnicities or beliefs . . . .128 
  
On March 26, the Syrian government accepted Kofi Annan’s six-point 
proposal.129 However, implementation again seemed unattainable. On April 
4, 2012, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2042,130 
authorizing a team of up to thirty unarmed military observers “to liaise with 
the parties and to begin reporting on the implementation of a full cessation 
of armed violence in all its forms by all parties.” The resolution noted the 
Syrian government’s commitment to implement a ceasefire as of April 10, 
which the parties at that time apparently intended to observe, and underlined 
the urgency of full implementation of Kofi Annan’s Annan’s proposed six-
point plan.131 
The Syrian government, through its representative, pledged to support 
Mr. Annan’s mission as long as it respected Syria’s sovereignty, saying, 
“The time for violence is gone . . . . the time for stewardship over us is gone 
  
 125. G.A. Res. 66/253, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/253 (Feb. 21, 2012) [hereinafter 
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 129. See U.N. Secretary-General, Syrian Government Accepts UN-Arab League 
Envoy’s Six-Point Plan to End Crisis (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.un.org/ 
apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41646&Cr=Syria&Cr1=&Kw1=six%2Dpoint+plan&Kw2=an
nan&Kw3=syria.  
 130. S.C. Res. 2042, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2042 (Apr. 14, 2012) [hereinafter U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/2042]. 
 131. See U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/176, supra note 122, at 1. 
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as well.”132 The Council stated that once the cessation of violence was 
sustained it would immediately establish a U.N. supervision mission in 
Syria to monitor all relevant aspects of the Annan plan. The parties to the 
six-point proposal, set forth in an annex to the resolution, agreed to  
· work in an “inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the 
legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people”; 
· stop the fighting through a U.N. supervised cessation of armed 
violence to protect civilians and stabilize the country, in which the 
government would stop moving troops into population centers and 
begin a pullback of military concentrations in those areas , and also 
work to cease armed violence, with U.N. supervision; the 
opposition would similarly stop fighting and work toward cessation 
of armed violence, with U.N. supervision; 
· ensure access for provision of humanitarian assistance, including a 
daily two-hour pause for humanitarian access; 
· “intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained 
persons”; 
· allow freedom of movement for journalists in the country; and 
· “respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate 
peacefully as legally guaranteed.”133 
But the fighting did not cease.134 Instead, it very soon escalated, and, as it 
was apparent that the called-for cessation of armed violence was “clearly 
incomplete,”135 the Security Council’s action again became urgent. On April 
21, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2043, establishing a 
ninety-day U.N. Supervision Mission to monitor the ceasefire and 
implementation of Resolution 2042 and deploying 300 unarmed military 
observers.136 
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However, all efforts were unavailing. On July 19, yet another Security 
Council resolution calling for sanctions on Damascus was vetoed by China 
and Russia.137 The Council’s inaction was widely criticized.138 In an August 
3 resolution, the General Assembly expressed its “deep concern at the lack 
of progress towards implementation of the six-point plan, and deplor[ed] the 
failure of the Security Council to agree on measures to ensure the 
compliance of Syrian authorities with its decisions.”139 The resolution, 
which was passed by 133 in favor, twelve against, and thirty-one 
abstentions,140 encouraged the Security Council to consider appropriate 
measures to hold accountable those responsible for human rights violations, 
including those that may amount to crimes against humanity.141 The 
resolution reiterated the General Assembly’s call for “an inclusive Syrian-
led political transition to a democratic, pluralistic political system”142 
In the face of what must have appeared a hopeless situation, Kofi Annan 
resigned as Joint Envoy on August 2, 2012, with very critical words for the 
Security Council’s inability to exercise its authority to save the lives of 
innocent victims in Syria.143 The Secretary-General announced that he and 
the Arab League had agreed upon Lakhdar Brahimi for Annan’s 
replacement as Joint Envoy on August 17.144 
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C. Regional Response 
Arab inter-governmental organizations have been at the forefront of the 
effort to address the conflict in Syria. The Arab Parliament, an eighty-eight-
member advisory committee of lawmakers from the forty-four-member 
nations of the Arab League, called for monitors to leave Syria as their 
presence provided an imprimatur for the actions of the Syrian government. 
The Speaker of the Parliament called this a “clear violation of the Arab 
League protocol which is to protect the Syrian people.” He added, “We are 
seeing an increase in violence, more people are being killed including 
children . . . and all this in the presence of Arab League monitors, which has 
angered the Arab people.”145 
The Arab League suspended Syria and imposed tough economic 
sanctions to isolate Syria from the rest of the membership in November 
2011 after the Assad government accepted a peace plan,146 but then 
blatantly ignored the plan and invaded Homs.147 On August 15, the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) suspended Syria from 
membership in the organization, which represents 1.5 billion Muslims, 
because of “strong concern over the massacres and the inhumane acts that 
are being committed against the Syrian people.”148 
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D. Sanctions against Syria149 
Numerous states and regional organizations imposed diplomatic and 
economic sanctions on Syria during the course of its deadly war against its 
people. A number of states closed their embassies in Damascus and/or 
expelled the representatives of Syria. Also, many states and regional 
organizations imposed economic sanctions. 
E. Nongovernmental Organizations’ (NGOs) Response 
NGOs have been equally frustrated in their efforts to make any 
meaningful inroads in protecting the Syrian population, but their work has 
been critical, nonetheless, in raising awareness of the ongoing Syrian crisis, 
as well as in monitoring the violations and providing humanitarian aid. The 
contributions of a selected few organizations are noted here. 
After all of the efforts on the intergovernmental scale had clearly failed 
to halt the violence in Syria, and as the Syrian government’s bloody 
repression drew ever greater and more organized resistance, on August 4, 
2012, the International Committee for the Red Cross, which is responsible 
for the Geneva Conventions and their application in conflicts, characterized 
the situation as a “non-international armed conflict,” or civil war.150 Thus, it 
announced that henceforth all parties were subject to international 
humanitarian law: 
Under international humanitarian law, the parties to the conflict must at all 
times distinguish between civilians and persons directly participating in 
hostilities. Attacks may be directed only against military objectives—
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never against civilians, or against civilian structures such as homes, 
schools or places of worship.151 
This development is important in establishing the threshold for findings 
of international crimes committed in the course of the repression. 
Within Syria, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent has had a major role in 
providing relief, but has been greatly hampered by the logistics of the war 
and competing political pressures.152 On the international level, 
organizations concerned with human rights in Syria include Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch (HRW), the International Coalition for 
Responsibility to Protect (ICR2P), and the Global Center for the 
Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P). 
Amnesty International has been extremely effective in bringing to light 
the egregious human rights violations occurring in the Syrian conflict, 
including issuing major reports such as Deadly Reprisals153 and All-Out 
Repression.154 Similarly, Human Rights Watch, ICR2P, and GCR2P have 
been actively monitoring the situation and issuing comprehensive reports 
and recommendations.155 
IV. SUPPLEMENTING RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT WITH RESPONSIBILITY 
WHILE PROTECTING 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s 2009 report, Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect,156 is a seminal document in which he elaborated 
on the concept and further clarified it, especially highlighting its three 
pillars.157 Pillar one states the primary responsibility of each state to protect 
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its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity.158 The second pillar states the international community’s 
commitment to provide assistance to states in capacity building so that they 
can protect their populations from these crimes.159 And pillar three 
articulates the international community’s responsibility to take “timely and 
decisive” action to prevent and halt these crimes when a state is “manifestly 
failing” to protect the population.160 A range of options for such action, both 
non-coercive and coercive, is available under Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of 
the U.N. Charter.161 The document also provides for the General Assembly 
to be proactive, as provided under Charter Articles 10-14 and under the 
“Uniting for Peace” resolution.162 
The Secretary-General emphasized the narrow scope of the 
Responsibility to Protect as limited to the four specified crimes. He 
recounted the impressive developments in Africa in redefining sovereignty, 
noting the Constitutive Act of the African Union, under which the Union 
has the right “to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the 
Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, 
and crimes against humanity.”163 
The General Assembly considered the Secretary-General’s report, 
deliberating over a period of three days164 — informal interactive dialogue 
on July 23165 and two days of debate on July 24166 and 28167 — and adopted 
the resolution The Responsibility to Protect on September 14, 2009.168 The 
resolution recalled the 2005 World Summit Outcome and took note of the 
report of the Secretary-General and of the “timely and productive” 
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deliberation in the General Assembly on the subject.169 In its operative part, 
the General Assembly decided “to continue its consideration of the 
responsibility to protect.”170  
Pursuant to that decision, the General Assembly discussed R2P in an 
informal interactive dialogue in August 2010.171 Preceding the dialogue, the 
Secretary-General submitted a report, “Early Warning, Assessment and the 
Responsibility to Protect.”172 In this report, he noted the UN’s weakness in 
its insufficient focus on early warning and risk analysis and the lack of 
sufficient information sharing during the Rwanda and Srebrenica 
tragedies.173 He referred to several gaps in “providing the timely 
information and assessment needed to implement the Responsibility to 
Protect in a balanced, responsible, rigorous manner.”174 
The Secretary-General underscored the importance of early engagement 
for understanding a given situation, which is equally important to framing 
strategies for either prevention or response. The report emphasized the need 
for well-informed action. Thus, [g]etting the right assessment—both of the 
situation on the ground and of the policy options available to the United 
Nations and to its regional and subregional partners—is essential for the 
effective, credible and sustainable implementation of the responsibility to 
protect and for fulfilling the commitments made by the Heads of State and 
Government at the 2005 World Summit.175 
The Secretary-General suggested that the Assembly discuss in its next 
interactive dialogue in 2011 the role of regional organizations in 
implementing the responsibility to protect.176 
In the General Assembly’s informal dialogue there was overall support 
for the R2P, although a few states remained critical.177 The General 
Assembly also welcomed the Secretary-General’s suggestion that the next 
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interactive dialogue focus on the role of regional organizations in 
implementing R2P.178 
The next informal interactive dialogue took place on July 12, 2011.179 
The Secretary-General presented a report on June 27, 2011, entitled “The 
Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect.”180 In his report, the Secretary General 
highlighted the partnership and collaboration between the U.N. Secretariat, 
on the one hand, and the regional organizations on the other. He noted the 
ongoing contacts between his special advisers on the prevention of genocide 
and on the responsibility to protect, and regional groups on both thematic 
issues and specific country situations.181 Addressing the General Assembly 
on July 12, the Secretary-General acknowledged that the record on atrocity 
prevention is still mixed and anticipated that dialogue would “open a 
sustained cross-regional conversation on lessons learned and practical 
experiences.”182 
The next interactive dialogue took place on September 5, 2012, on the 
third pillar—collective, timely, and decisive response when a state is 
“manifestly unwilling to protect its population.”183 As in the past, prior to 
the Assembly meeting, the Secretary-General presented his report on July 
25, entitled “Responsibility to protect: timely and decisive response.”184 
The timing was critical for the discussion of the third pillar, as the 
complexity of the Syrian situation had presented a dilemma for invocation 
and application of R2P. Unquestionably, the Syrian government has the 
responsibility to protect its population, which, as the first pillar mandates, is 
an affirmation of each state’s duty under international law. As to the second 
pillar, the international community’s assistance to states to develop local 
capacities to protect populations from atrocity crimes, the rapid pace of 
events in Syria made such assistance impossible. Every initiative of the 
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international community was either ignored or rebuffed by the Assad 
government. And protests against the government were brutally repressed 
by the Assad regime, which led to the use of violence by the opposition, as 
well.  
As the preceding discussion has shown, state-directed crimes against 
humanity and war crimes were committed in Syria and continue as of the 
time of this writing. The national authorities have manifestly failed to 
protect their population from atrocities and intense violence, which has 
resulted in high casualties; they indeed have been the primary perpetrators 
of these crimes. Vetoes by China and Russia in the Security Council did not 
permit the invocation and application of R2P, so neither effective non-
coercive nor coercive measures could be taken by the international 
community. However, even if the Security Council could reach a consensus 
on taking effective non-coercive measures against the Assad regime in order 
to compel the security forces and militia to halt their excessive violence, 
assuming that the Syrian government did not halt its brutal repression, it is 
doubtful that there could be agreement on collective military intervention. 
Although there is a stronger case for the use of the third pillar of R2P in 
Syria than there was in Libya, and there is a moral imperative to react when 
such egregious violations of human rights occur the situation in Syria is 
complex. The army is strong and well trained, extremists have reportedly 
joined the ranks of the rebels, and the opposition lacks unity. Minorities are 
apprehensive about possible persecution under a new regime, and there is a 
likelihood that in light of the inflammatory regional setting, a military 
intervention might trigger regional instability. Furthermore, a nuanced 
approach under R2P is called for, because R2P may not be invoked unless 
there are reasonable prospects of success in protecting the lives and well-
being of people, so that the situation is made better for them rather than 
worse. Coupled with this complexity in Syria there were concerns about 
NATO having exceeded the Security Council’s mandate in its 
implementation of Resolution 1973 by focusing on regime change in Libya 
rather than on protection of the people.185 
This was the situation after the second Russian and Chinese veto in the 
Security Council on October 4, 2011,186 that the Permanent Representative 
of Brazil, Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, presented to the Secretary General a 
concept note, entitled Responsibility while protecting: Elements for the 
development and promotion of a concept,187 for circulation to member 
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states. The note stressed the “painful consequences” of past interventions—
aggravation of existing conflicts, increased incidence both of terrorism and 
vulnerability of civilian populations, and new cycles of violence— and a 
“growing perception” that R2P might be misused for purposes such as 
regime change.188 
RWP highlights prevention as “always the best policy”189 and the use of 
force as a measure of last resort,190 always to be authorized by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII, or “in exceptional circumstances, by the 
General Assembly, in line with” the Uniting for Peace Resolution.191 Force 
must meet the standard of proportionality and not exceed the mandate 
conferred by the Security Council or the General Assembly, nor “generate 
more harm than it was authorized to prevent.”192 
In addition the concept paper calls for the three pillars to strictly follow 
“political subordination and chronological sequencing.” The emphasis on 
sequencing is to distinguish between collective responsibility in the 
application of non-coercive measures and collective security, where there is 
a threat or situation of violence against civilians that is characterized as a 
threat to international peace and security.193 It also proposes the creation of 
a monitoring and assessment system to review the use of force as it 
evolves.194 
RWP, which is aimed at ensuring strict regulation of R2P, supplements 
R2P by adding new principles and procedures. It suggests specific criteria 
which the Security Council must consider before authorizing the use of 
force: force must be a measure of last resort, it must meet the test of 
proportionality, and it must not cause “more harm than it was authorized to 
prevent.”195 These criteria are similar to those recommended by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
discussed earlier, which form the basis of R2P.196 RWP also calls for 
enhanced Security Council procedures for monitoring and assessing the 
interpretation and implementation of the Council’s resolution authorizing 
the use of force.  
RWP’s focus on prevention is a reaffirmation of R2P’s pillar one. And 
its suggested criteria on the use of force are helpful supplements to R2P. 
But the proposed chronological sequencing of R2P’s three-pillar framework 
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is a departure from the 2005 World Summit Outcome and from Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon’s 2009 articulation of a three-pillar framework.197 At 
the U.N. Informal Discussion on RWP of February 21, 2012, the 
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICR2P) 
emphatically made this point:  
The Secretary-General never called for the chronological sequencing of 
the pillars but rather established them together as representative of the full 
scope and range of measures necessary to protect. Every crisis situation is 
unique and requires a response according to the circumstances and needs 
of the population. All actors must have the full range of tools available 
when operating to prevent or halt crimes under RtoP. Restructuring the 
three-pillar framework would risk creating a system for prevention and 
reaction that fails to consider the particular elements of a crisis. 
Furthermore, the chronological sequencing of the three pillars would risk 
impeding timely and decisive action by limiting the array and flexibility of 
measures available and establishing required actions to be taken regardless 
of the needs of those under threat of mass atrocities. It is in this regard, 
that ICRtoP strongly believes that the conceptual foundation of the 
Responsibility to Protect must not be renegotiated.198 
The distinction between collective responsibility, which can be exercised 
through non-coercive measures, and collective security, requiring the 
Security Council’s characterization as a threat to international peace and 
security, also raises concerns as it goes beyond the language of paragraph 
139 of the Summit Outcome,199 which explicitly refers to Chapter VII for 
the the taking of collective action in the exercise of R2P. The ICR2P has 
again aptly stated that “genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
ethnic cleansing are by definition and under international law threats to 
international peace and security, thus requiring Member States and the UN 
to take preventive and reactive measures when faced with the threat of these 
crimes.”200 
It is in light of the Syrian crisis and Brazil’s RWP initiative that we 
should consider the Secretary-General’s July 2012 report and the General 
Assembly’s informal interactive dialogue of September 2012. In his report, 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon provided an historical context for the 
genesis of the R2P concept and its development within the United Nations 
since its 2005 adoption. The report noted the three-pillar framework and 
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asserted that these pillars “are not sequential and are of equal importance; 
without all three the concept would be incomplete.”201 
The Secretary-General emphasized the broad range of measures 
available under the third pillar of R2P, which articulates the member states’ 
responsibility to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when 
a state is manifestly failing to protect its population.202 While R2P 
emphasizes prevention, the report suggests that one should not draw too 
sharp a distinction between prevention and response, for  
[p]revention and response must be seen as closely connected. Early 
prevention should address structural factors that affect a state’s capacity 
both to prevent and to respond to the four specified crimes and violations. 
The Office of my two Special Advisers has developed an “analysis 
framework” that identifies factors that can be used to assess the risk of 
these crimes and violations. Further work could be done to develop and 
sharpen response tools to address each risk factor.203 
In discussing the connections between prevention and response, the 
Secretary-General noted that the first two pillars of R2P are generally 
associated with prevention and the third pillar with response. But “[t]he 
dividing lines are . . . not so clear in practice, as action under either pillar 
one or two may include elements of both prevention and response.”204 
The report addressed the issue of sequence by stating that there is an 
interactive and mutually supportive relationship between the three pillars. It 
emphasized that: 
[p]illars are not sequenced. The question should therefore never be under 
what circumstances the responsibility to protect “applies”. This wrongly 
implies that there are situations where states do not have a responsibility to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. It is clear that every state has an inherent 
responsibility to protect. The question we confront is one of how best to 
achieve the goals of RtoP in different circumstances.205 
The report stated that U.N. peacekeeping missions are implemented 
under pillar two and therefore should be distinguished from action under 
pillar three because, “[w]hile the work of peacekeepers may contribute to 
the achievement of R2P goals, the two concepts of the responsibility to 
protect and the protection of civilians have separate and distinct 
prerequisites and objectives.”206 
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The report reiterates that “[r]esponsibility is an ally of sovereignty, in 
that collective action by the international community is not called for where 
a State fully discharges its sovereign responsibility to protect.”207 The 
Secretary-General also set forth five lessons learned from experience to 
date: 1) R2P should be applied consistently and uniformly, but as each 
situation is distinct, the methods and tools used should differ according to 
each situation; 2) it is essential that principles are applied consistently both 
in utterances and implementation so that international responses do not lead 
to charges of double standards and selectivity; 3) experience has shown the 
need to understand how the three pillars relate to and reinforce each other; 
4) an effective and integrated strategy to protect populations is likely to 
include elements of both prevention and response; and 5) prevention and 
response measures are most effective when the United Nations works in 
tandem with its regional partners.208 
The report discusses at length both non-coercive and coercive tools 
available for implementation under Chapters VI, VII, and VIII209 of the 
U.N. Charter to help protect populations from the four specified crimes and 
violations. These include mediation and preventive diplomacy, public 
advocacy, fact-finding missions and commissions of inquiry, monitoring 
and observer missions, the International Criminal Court, and finally, when 
diplomatic and other peaceful means fail, “timely and decisive” collective 
action is called for under Chapter VII.210 In concluding this section, the 
report emphasized that  
[t]here is room for Member States to think and act more strategically. 
Measures, especially those under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, 
should be applied as early as possible. While military enforcement must 
remain part of the toolbox, our primary aim should be to respond early and 
effectively in non-coercive ways and thereby reduce the need for force. . . . 
. Strengthening modes of collaboration between the national, the regional 
and the international levels in this regard continues to be necessary.211 
While reemphasizing that “[t]he integrity and credibility of the concept 
depends upon its full, faithful and consistent application,”212 the report 
referred to those at the international, regional, national, and local levels who 
have obligations to protect their populations and those who must respond 
under pillar three in implementing R2P.213 It specifically noted the role of 
the Human Rights Council, the ten U.N. treaty bodies of human rights 
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conventions, the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, the 
U.N. Children’s Fund, and the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Refugees, along with individual and regional and sub regional 
organizations. It also noted the role of humanitarian organizations, national 
and international civil society organizations, private companies and 
businesses, and individuals.  
The report concluded this section by stating that the international 
community’s response to these atrocity crimes “is most effective when 
actions are tailored to individual circumstances and calibrated 
appropriately.”214 It emphasized that in all situations, “we must not lose 
sight of our common goal—the protection of populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity—and we must 
focus on finding a common viable strategy for achieving it.”215 
The Secretary-General welcomed the Brazilian initiative on 
“responsibility while protecting,” stating that it had “received considerable 
attention from Member States as the international community has sought to 
refine and apply the concept” in light of the Libyan intervention.216 With the 
expanded use of the concept as it has been invoked in several situations, the 
report noted the need to understand how to operationalize the concept “in a 
manner that is responsible, sustainable and effective,”217 and also the 
importance of conducting early warning and assessment “fairly, prudently 
and professionally, without political interference or double standards.”218 
While observing that in essence the “responsibility while protecting” 
calls for “doing the right thing, in the right place, at the right time and for 
the right reasons,” the report focused on the need for assessment because 
“[a]n early and flexible response strategy requires dynamic assessment, 
focusing on trends and developments, not just the latest headlines.”219 
On the Libyan crisis the report observed that the Security Council action 
under Chapter VII was authorized after most member states had concluded 
that peaceful measures had proved inadequate. But it acknowledged that 
some member states are concerned that non-coercive measures were not 
given adequate time to take effect, and that the implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 1973 exceeded the Council’s mandate.220 Thus, going 
forward, these concerns must be taken into account and the Security 
Council must continue to respond flexibly, as it has a wide degree of 
latitude to decide on the appropriate course of action.221 
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Acknowledging that civilian lives were lost during the air campaign 
notwithstanding NATO’s focus on minimizing civilian casualties, the report 
emphasized the importance of military actors “taking all possible 
precautions to avoid situations that place civilians at risk.”222 It reiterated 
the Secretary-General’s preference for prevention in implementing R2P, 
which requires non-forcible measures. However, it emphasized that 
coercive measures should neither be left out of the protection strategy nor 
set aside for use only after all other measures have been applied and found 
to be inadequate. Thus, the report favored an early and flexible response, 
taking into consideration all the tools available under Chapters VI, VII, and 
VIII of the U.N. Charter, and tailoring each circumstance to each situation 
to ensure the protection of populations.223 
While observing that the application of the third pillar will sometimes 
entail difficult choices, the report cautioned:  
Disagreements about the past must not stand in the way of our 
determination to protect populations in the present. Nor should Heads of 
State and Government lose sight of the commitment made to act in 
accordance with the responsibility to protect. The initiative on 
“responsibility while protecting” provides a useful pathway for continuing 
dialogue about ways of bridging different perspectives and forging 
strategies for timely and decisive responses to crimes and violations 
relating to RtoP. Suggestions for improving decision-making in such 
circumstances and reviewing implementation are useful catalysts for 
further discussion.224 
In conclusion the report noted that, while the concept has been widely 
accepted and has been invoked by the Security Council and the General 
Assembly, controversy persists on aspects of implementation, especially on 
the use of coercive measures to protect populations.225 Thus it stressed the 
need to employ all the coercive and non-coercive measures at an early stage 
to ensure prevention and to reduce the need for more coercive action to 
protect populations, but it reiterated, “Inaction is not an option.”226 The 
Secretary-General called for continued dialogue on the responsibility to 
protect in the General Assembly.227 
In his remarks on September 5, 2012, to the General Assembly’s 
Informal Interactive Dialogue on the responsibility to protect,228 the 
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Secretary-General said, “‘Never again’ is the oft-heard cry. But I am 
haunted by the fear that we do not live up to this call.”229 Noting that the 
R2P is a concept whose time has come, he emphasized that it reaffirms 
“sovereignty as a positive responsibility” for governments to protect their 
populations.230 
Addressing the concerns related to selectivity in invoking the concept 
and the loss of innocent lives in military operations undertaken to protect 
populations, coupled with disagreements on both the oversight of 
implementation methods and the interpretation of Security Council 
resolutions, he said that “fears of its possible misuse should not inhibit its 
use in the face of incitement and grave violence”231 
The Secretary-General noted that the Security Council had explicitly 
referred to the concept of Responsibility to Protect in its resolutions on 
Libya and Yemen. Also, the General Assembly, the Human Rights 
Committee, and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, had referred to 
R2P in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, 
Syria, Yemen, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He stated that 
there have been successes with the Responsibility to Protect, but also that 
concerns have been expressed about missions exceeding the intent and 
mandate of the resolutions on which they were based. He stressed that, 
notwithstanding concerns and disagreements about the past, we must move 
forward, for “we cannot stand by while populations fall victim to these 
grave crimes and violations.”232 
Following the Secretary-General’s address, deliberations in the General 
Assembly found a general consensus on the primacy of the preventive 
aspects of R2P.233 The representative of Germany, however, emphasized the 
equality of all three pillars, which precludes an “either/or approach” 
regarding prevention and more coercive action, as well as a strict 
sequencing of measures under each pillar.234 He said that Germany had set 
up the structures to implement the second pillar by establishing an inter-
ministerial working group for civil crisis prevention and early warning, as 
well as an adjunct advisory council, and was in the process of appointing a 
national focal point for R2P.235 
The representative of the European Union to the United Nations 
emphasized that the three pillars are “parallel and finely balanced” and thus 
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there cannot be “a prioritization of action under one pillar over another or a 
chronological sequencing between them.”236 Among other participants, the 
representative of Brazil noted that its RWP initiative could make a 
contribution to the debate, as it provides 1) a set of guidelines for the 
Security Council to take into account before mandating any military force, 
and 2) an enhanced monitoring and review process that Council members 
could use to “discuss mandates during the implementation process.”237 
The South African representative expressed concern that “international 
intervention might be used” in order to “effect regime change by those with 
political agendas,” and warned that the Security Council mandate not be the 
“pretense for operating beyond international law.”238 The representative of 
Singapore called for moving beyond “the mantra that the three pillars were 
‘equally important’ . . . ‘mutually reinforcing,’ and ‘supportive,’” for, while 
member states would have no problem with supporting pillars one and two, 
it is pillar three which is a fundamental principle behind the R2P concept 
and on which attention must be focused.239 Reflecting on the intervention in 
Libya, he said that while the Security Council intervention was seen by 
many as a “vindication” of R2P, there remain “deep concerns” over the 
action.240 He added, “How R2P was invoked to justify Council action on 
Libya has cast a long shadow, resulting in the current impasse over Syria. 
Arguably, what happened to Libya has not only not helped the long-term 
development of R2P, but may have done it damage.”241 
The Singapore representative criticized the Permanent Members of the 
Security Council for not agreeing to the “recommendation that they 
consider refraining from using the veto to block Council action aimed at 
preventing or ending genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”242 
He echoed one of the “lessons learn[ed]” mentioned by the Secretary-
General in his report -- that R2P principles must be applied consistently in 
rhetoric and implementation so as to avoid the “accusations of double 
standards and selectivity.243 “The representative of Malaysia also 
emphasized that the biggest challenge continued to be “the selectivity and 
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double standards practiced” in implementing R2P.244 A few representatives, 
including those from India and Russia, challenged the Secretary-General’s 
statement that there should be no sequencing.245 
V. OPERATIONALIZING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
The preceding discussion raises more questions than it answers. The 
deliberations in the General Assembly since 2009 have demonstrated 
consensus on what Secretary-General Ban calls “pillar one,” and which 
Heads of State and Government had accepted at the World Summit in 
paragraph 138 of the Summit Outcome Document, viz, that “[e]ach 
individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,” 
including their incitement, which “entails the prevention of such crime . . . 
through appropriate and necessary means.”246 Thus, there is no situation in 
which a state does not have the primary responsibility to protect its 
population.  
Similarly, no state questions in principle what Ban calls the second 
pillar: that the international community should “encourage and help States 
to exercise this responsibility,”247 and that there is a commitment “to 
helping States build capacity to protect their populations from [these 
atrocity crimes] and . . . . assisting those which are under stress before crises 
and conflicts break out.”248 The term “appropriate and necessary” must 
mean that the state itself is seeking help to exercise this responsibility and to 
build capacity to protect its population from these crimes. 
Also, the Summit Outcome calls on the U.N. to establish an early 
warning capability and for states to support the U.N. in accomplishing this 
goal.249 The Secretary-General has already focused his attention on early 
warning, which was the theme of his 2010 Report.250 Thus, what the 
appropriate measures are and how to reach agreement on them are important 
questions here. 
The underlying purpose of the second pillar is to prevent the perpetration 
of these crimes. For if preventive diplomacy and using all the measures 
listed in Article 33 of the U.N. Charter for peaceful settlement of disputes 
were to succeed, there would be no need for the use of force. 
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The critical question that remains unresolved relates to the 
implementation of what Secretary-General Ban calls “pillar three”: 
collective military action in a “timely and decisive manner” and on a “case 
by case basis” when peaceful means are inadequate and “national 
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations” from the 
specified crimes.251 A prerequisite is that Chapter VI and Chapter VIII 
measures either have been exhausted or are inapplicable. Currently, there 
are no guidelines and the action is, of course, left to the Security Council, 
where decision-making ends up in the hands of the fifteen members, 
uncontrolled by any guidelines or constraints. Consequently, we need 
criteria or guidelines to determine whether an armed response is 
appropriate, as a last resort. 
It follows that for the operationalization of R2P we need common 
standards and criteria to govern the use of force, that is, to decide whether, 
based upon the information received, the situation warrants the invocation 
and application of the third pillar. Thus the pertinent question is what 
standards and principles will help us measure and analyze the information to 
determine whether the third pillar is applicable.  
Following the tragedies in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, 
Rwanda, and Liberia, I suggested in a 1992 article that for an intervention to 
be valid on humanitarian grounds it must meet the criteria of necessity, 
proportionality, purpose, and maximization of the best outcomes.252 On the 
criterion of necessity, the suggestion was “the existence of gross, persistent, 
and systematic violations of human rights which are likely to result in 
massive loss of life in any country.” Those criteria and the ICISS 
suggestions regarding the “just cause” threshold and precautionary 
principles253 also present a useful starting point for deliberations on the 
responsibility to protect at the UN, with active participation of the 
Secretary-General’s special adviser on the prevention of genocide and the 
civil society. The Brazilian initiative is indeed a useful tool in this context. 
CONCLUSION 
Syria has tested the responsibility to protect. The three pillars articulated 
by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon offer a wide range of actions by the 
international community to prevent and halt mass atrocities. The main 
contention is on when and how to apply the third pillar. For that to be 
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operational the need for common standards and principles is evident. The 
U.N. General Assembly and Security Council must set standards for 
evaluating the risks, determining the urgency of the situation and 
concluding whether a state is actually “manifestly failing” to meet its 
responsibility to protect. The challenge is to find the common ground to set 
such standards, notwithstanding the reality that without political will and 
cooperation among the permanent members of the Security Council no 
action is possible at the United Nations. 
 
